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LABOR LAW-OBJECTS OF UNION ACTION-ORGANIZATION OF MANAGERS
OF RETAIL CHAIN SroREs AS PROPER OBJECT-The owner and operator of
retail food stores located throughout the nation brought action to enjoin strike
· activities by the defendant union, which sought recognition as bargaining agent
for managers and clerks in the local stores. Both clerks and store managers had
been members of the defendant local unions since 1937, and the latter, acting
under certification as bargaining representative for both groups of employees
under the National Labor Relations Act, had negotiated contracts with the plaintiff covering managers and clerks continuously since that time. Upon the
refusal of the plaintiff to include the store managers in the contract, or to
recognize the clerks' unions as the representatives of the store managers, the
union struck and the present action was commenced. Held, with a dissenting
opinion, that the union activities in seeking recognition as bargaining agent
for local retail store managers, who were supervisory employees, were not
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reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor, were not in
furtherance of any proper labor objective, and, as a matter of sound public
policy, were enjoinable within equity jurisdiction of the court. Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Internatianal Assn., 41 Cal. (2d) 567, 261 P. (2d) 721
(1953)
It is well settled that the objects of peaceful concerted activity by unions
must be proper1 and that the propriety of those objectives may be determined
by the state as a matter of public policy so long as the decision is not arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in conflict with an applicable federal statute. 2 Since supervisors have been excluded from the benefits of the National Labor Relations
Act, 3 the representation by a single union of both managers and the employees
they supervise would seem to be a proper question of public policy for the state.
In the principal case, however, the conflict within the court was caused by the
majority's apparent disregard of a state statute which, according to the dissenting
opinion, declared the policy of the state in providing that all employees have
the right to self-organization in unions of their own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of their employment, and to engage in concerted activities
for their mutual benefit and protection.4 The question of whether a supervisor is an employee under such a statute, and the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit for him, have posed problems of increasing complexity
for labor boards, both federal and state. The NLRB, after some hesitancy in
policy, held that supervisors were employees under the original federal act.6
But except in particular industries where joint collective bargaining by supervisors and workers was traditional, 6 or in instances where a supervisor was
one in name only,7 the NLRB was reluctant to declare appropriate a bargaining unit composed of both supervisors and the men they supervise.8 A similar
result is found in states having comprehensive labor legislation, none of the
boards denying that a supervisor is an employee under the acts9 unless specifically
1 Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance and Bartenders International
League of America v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 S. (2d) 696 (1947). 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT §§783, 784 (1939).
2 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773
(1950); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950).
3 61 Stat. L. 138, 151 (1947), 2 U.S.C. (1952) §§142, 164.
41 Cal. Labor Code (Deering, 1953) §923.
5 Hearst Publications, Inc., 25 N.L.R.B. 621 (1940); Boeing Airplane Co., 46
N.L.R.B. 267 (1942). SMITH, Ll.BOR LAw, 2d ed., pp. 66-68 (1953). But see also Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 463 (1946).
6 The printing trades: Chicago Rotoprint Co., 45 NL.R.B. 1263 (1942); the maritime
industry: Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 102 (1936). For other trades and indl.19tries in which joint collective bargaining by supervisors and workers has been recognized
by the NLRB, see "Union Membership and Collective Bargaining by Foremen," U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bul. 745 (1943).
7 Shell Petroleum Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 831 (1938).
8 Numerous cases illustrating this policy may be found in NLRB TBIRD ANmrAL
Rm>on'l' 180 (1938); NLRB FIFTH ANmrAL REPORT 70 (1940).
9 Third Avenue Transit Corp., 16 Lab. Rel. Rep. 694 (1945); Sears, Roebuck and
Co., 8 L.R.R.M. 393 (1941). See also New York State Labor Relations Board v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 52 N.Y.S. (2d) 590 (1944).
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excluded by them,10 and all of the boards agreeing that supervisors and their
employees as a matter of policy should not generally be placed in the same
bargaining unit. 11 Thus the majority in the principal case comes to a conclusion not unlike the decisions of labor boards in other jurisdictions. But
while in other states authority is vested in a proper agency to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit, no such authority is specifically granted to the
courts of California. Consequently the question may involve the propriety of
a state court's disregard for the unqualified assertion of the legislature that
employees may freely choose their own bargaining representative.12 In the
final analysis the basic policy decision should take into account two factors:
the history of collective bargaining in the particular unit,13 and the degree of
proximity of the functions of the supervisors in question to those of either
real policy-making management or to the rank and file employee. 14 In most
situations, the grouping of supervisors with the workers they supervise will add
immeasurably to an already complicated labor relations picture, and thus on
purely pragmatic grounds15- should be discouraged wherever found in its initial
stages. 16 But such a policy must be administered with discretion, for, as in
the principal case, it is difficult to believe that social benefit will be derived from
the destruction of a bargaining relationship with a twelve year history of
presumably successful negotiations and contracts.17
John F. Dodge,. Jr., S.Ed.
10 In Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Colorado, supervisors are specifically excluded from
the coverage of the labor relations acts.
11 Bee Line, Inc., 6 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 686 (1943); Loew's Boston Theatres Co., 2 L.R.R.
M. 557 (1938). See also PENNSYLVANIA LAlloR RELATIONS BoARD, F1FTH ANmrAL REPORT 50 (1941); NEw Yonx: STATE LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, SIXTH ANmrAL REPORT
53 (1942).
12 As the dissenting opinion points out, the right to choose the bargaining representative is unqualifiedly reserved to the workers by the California statute, note 4 supra. And
there is no mention in the statute of the appropriate bargaining unit, or who is to make the
decision concerning it. Since the problem of the appropriate unit has been judicially relevant only since the passage of the NLRA and the subsequent Little Wagner Acts, and
has been limited to questions of certification under those acts, its judicial use in the context
of the principal case may be questioned.
13 See note 6 supra.
14 Another factor of minor importance is the feasibility of finding some unit which
is appropriate, when a proposed unit is denied to supervisors desiring to unionize. For
without a doubt foremen have a right to join a union of some type. Packard Motor Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947), and 61 Stat. L. 151 (1947), 2 U.S.C.
(1952) §164.
15 Unfortunately many of the arguments posed on both sides of the question have been
purely ideological, thus furnishing little practical aid in solving an important problem of
industrial relations.
16 See an excellent discussion of the whole subject in LmTER, THE FoRE:MAN IN
ImmsTRIAL RELATIONS 126-165 (1948). Also KILLINGSWORTH, STATE LAlloR RELATIONS
Aro:s 198-203 (1948).
17 By merely enjoining the picketing by the defendant union on the ground that there
had been violence, many of the problems of the principal case could have been avoided.
In addition, an argument on the conflicting policy toward supervisors represented on the
one hand by the Taft-Hartley Act and on the other by the California statute could have
proved interesting. But such an argument was absent in the principal case and is largely
outside of the scope of this note.

